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Abstract 
The message negotiations involved in the Orthus authentication protocol for self-contained realms are a matter of prior 
publication. Orthus provides Authentication of a compliant entity to a realm, and a clear demarcation between realm membership 
verification and service access. Version II of the protocol introduces some security enhancements. Furthermore, functional 
descriptions of the supplementary application and functioning of supporting services and architecture in the Enterprise 
Environment are provided. Namely, those protocol exchanges necessary for the establishment of realm-to-realm trusts, and 
hierarchies, including a remote realm location protocol, and security hardening functions such as key revocation and re-issue 
procedures are described. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Program Chairs. 
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1. Introduction 
Kerberos1, the prevalent Authentication Protocol, maintains a set of security keys for those Services located 
within its realm. This could be perceived as incorporating a partial access authorisation system. In comparison, 
Orthus2 is arranged differently; realm authentication and service authorisation are strictly separated. Secure 
authentication systems are primarily problematic to design. From 1978, the Needham and Schroeder protocol3, was 
an early model, which was subsequently used as the basis for Kerberos’ architecture. 
The first version of Orthus, analogous to Kerberos, described functions that facilitate authentication, but the end  
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result differs in providing a ticket verifying realm membership only, consequently this ticket does not grant access to 
those services within the realm. Version II of Orthus (Refer to original documentation for full description.) presents 
some security enhancements, the essence of which are illustrated below, and diagrammatically in figure 1. 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Schematic of Orthus message flow 
 
Message 1. constitutes  A  AS: A+RA+TGS+N1+Tf 
 
Where: A is the clients’ realm name 
 AS is the Authentication Service Realm name 
RA is the Realm name the client wishes to join      
TGS is the realm name of the Ticket Granting service N1 is a nonce 
Tf are client options, from(start) till(expiration, or time-to-live) rtime (renew till time request) 
 
This is the application by client A to the Authentication Service, AS, to join the realm. If the exact same packet 
constellation is subsequently received three times within 120 seconds further messages will be silently discarded 
without being forwarded onto the Ticket Granting Service, TGS, avoiding Denial of Service, DoS, attacks. 
 
Message 2. constitutes  ASTGS: A+RA+KTGS(KA+A+RA+Tf)+KA(RTGS+TGS+N1+Tf) 
 
Where: KTGS is the encryption key of TGS  
KA is the clients’ encryption key derived from their password as previously described 
RTGS is the realm of TGS 
Note: KTGS has been pre-shared out of band 
 
The AS informs the TGS it has verified the clients’ realm membership by forwarding a Ticket granting 
permit and session information to it. Otherwise, it forwards the same packets onto the TGS as received from the 
client, which the TGS processes as a signal of denial. Within Tf, the start time effectively constitutes a time stamp. 
In contrast to Orthus version I, IPA is no longer included, as IP addresses can be easily forged in software, and its 
specification within the protocol can cause further problems in Network Address Translation, NAT, environments. 
 
Message 3. constitutes  TGSA: A+RA+KA(KASS+A+RA+ RTGS+TGS+N1+Tf+KSSU) 
 
Where: KASS is a session key generated by the TGS for the sole use of A and SS 
KSsu is the encryption key for realm authentication 
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The TGS sends the client modified session information as confirmation of realm membership. Note the 
TGS can write into the KA encrypted ticket because it has received the relevant key, encrypted by its own key. 
Otherwise depending upon the message received from the AS, it will return to the client a message consisting of 
A+N1+Tf; which programmatically the client recognises as originating from itself and as a denial of realm 
membership. Deliberately not all the packets sent requesting membership are returned thus avoiding simple replays. 
Possession of the Kssu key is critical as it is used to encrypt the session unique KASS key; its security is 
assured by encryption with KA. Albeit placing increased dependence on the encryption algorithms protecting it, and 
the enforcement of strong password complexity polices. 
 
Message 4. constitutes  ASS:  A+O+KSSU(KASS+RA+A+Tf1) 
 
Where: Tf1 represents a new set of client options relative to SS channel 
 O represents options that can be requested by A 
 
The client can now request access to its desired Server Service, SS. 
 
Message 5. constitutes  SS  A: KASS(TS2+SK+SQNO) 
 
Where: TS2 is a new timestamp 
 SK is a flag requesting a new sub-key 
 SQNO is a sequence number generated by SS 
 
In the background, the SS will process authorisation for the client by a separate mechanism, and return to 
the client its own authentication material encrypted with the session key that it has received from the client. If for 
any reason the client is not satisfied with the identity of SS it must drop the connection attempt and start again. After 
three unsuccessful attempts, no more are made and an alert is raised for attention of the realm administrator. 
The AS and TGS remain separate services so that they can function independently of each other, as they 
have different functional areas, even though in the majority of cases the function of one is triggered by the other. 
 
This paper discusses methods for a client in one realm can authenticate itself to services in another realm, 
especially given the added decoupling of authorisation from authentication relevant to the Orthus protocol. 
2. Problem statement 
The underlying infrastructure features required to support Orthus must be considered. It may be observed 
that Orthus relies heavily on Domain Name System, DNS4, name to IP address resolution in order to function, and 
consequently Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, DHCP, for initial configuration upon joining a realm. It is 
necessary to assess the relative advantages of User Datagram Protocol, UDP, (RFC 768)5 compared to Transmission 
Control Protocol, TCP (RFC 675)6,7 for protocol transmission, and port assignment. 
Kerberos8 is designed for the classic realm model, whereby an administrator is responsible for setting up 
and configuring each individual client and user within their realm and consequently has intimate knowledge of all 
connecting nodes, thus acting as a hostname register. In practice in a global environment, the realm administrator for 
region G, may have no prior knowledge of the impending visit of the executive from region W. Greater flexibility is 
needed and often we have to allow realm membership to foreign clients, where the joining client may already 
possesses a host-name given within the realm. A standardised corporate wide host naming policy would normally 
circumvent this, but how does this cope with company acquisitions and mergers? 
3. Comparison of Transport Mechanisms 
UDP is handshake-less protocol, being connectionless delivery is not guaranteed, sequence re-ordering, nor 
duplicate detection. The advantage for real-time applications, which cannot wait for out of sequence packets, lies 
with its non-re-transmission mechanism, which also makes it suitable for simple query response usage. Being 
‘stateless’ (the transmitter does not retain state information after sending) it is suitable for large numbers of clients 
accessing the same source. Not requiring a response, it is ideally suited to unidirectional, broadcast, application. 
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In comparison, TCP offers reliability with inbuilt mechanisms for managing message acknowledgment, 
timeout, and retransmission sequence – when the second transmitted message is received out of sequence it is 
buffered until the first message is received, and they can be passed up the stack in the correct order. Larger overhead 
is involved – three packets are required to set up port based connections before user date is transmitted; including 
mechanisms for congestion control. 
4. Analysis 
4.1 Network Transport 
 
The browser has become the common user interface of choice both for Internet and intranet based 
application, and these tools are using the client-server Hypertext Transfer Protocol, HTTP, application layer request-
response protocol (as defined in RFC’s 7230 -7235)9. Orthus does not require many of TCPs features, and 
compatibility with HTTP may be assured by using either of the underlying UDP or TCP protocols. Although many 
TCP features are set by flags, disabling these still results in a greater and unnecessary overhead, and leaving the 
remaining preference being for UDP. 
In network technology terms a port is a software structure identified by a port number, its purpose is to 
uniquely identify different applications or processes running on a client thereby enabling them to share a single 
physical connection to a packet-switched network. Data packets are routed across the network to a destination IP 
address, and upon reaching their destination may be further routed to specific process bound to the destination port 
number. An application can bind a socket to its data transmission endpoint, which is a combination of an IP address 
and a service port. Thus traffic can be more efficiently routed to an application which ‘listens’ on its assigned port. 
At the time of writing, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, well-known ports 26 and 40 remain unassigned. As a 
suggestion, subject to approval by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, IANA10, a number from this range 
could be reserved for the LAN/WAN implementation of Orthus. 
Although Orthus does not specify, and therefore assumes, that DNS information upon which it relies is 
genuine, in the interests of full security, we must take an interest in ensuring that this cannot be disrupted by the 
insertion of a rouge host providing false name resolution directing clients to further rogue services. 
The DNSSEC11 (Secure DNS) protocol provides a backward compatible means of ensuring DNS 
information integrity, and host authentication. It does this by implementing digital signatures on the records 
transferred. It is thus reliant on a repository of PKI digital certificates. It is not recommended that the certificate 
issuing authority be located on the same host as the DNS service. Internet facing DNS services should be using an 
internationally recognised standard. 
 
4.2 Revocation 
 
The possible compromise of two important Orthus encryption keys has to be considered, namely KSSU and 
KASS. The latter is not so critical, as this is a time dependent unique session key, should an administrator determine 
this key has been compromised, the session may be terminated, forcing the generation of a new valid key. This may 
appear inconvenient and inelegant but in any case, a compromised session should be discontinued. 
However, compromise of the former is more serious. The TGS can readily be set to issue a new key from 
the point of time of compromise detection, which would be in message 3 sent in response to future client requests. 
And it will be used appropriately in the subsequent message 4 sent from the client to their desired Server Service. 
Because the SS does not store the previous key ostensibly, no revocation procedure is required in this case. 
There is a definite need to discuss revocation procedures as in the case of a client delaying transmission of 
message 4, where in the meantime a new KSSU has been issued, as can happen with replay attacks. It can be observed 
that a system of nonce’s, issued in message 3 by the TGS, (having the client perform a similar transaction in 
message 4 to the SS would not be logical) has no relevance to the integrity of the key. Here, a second channel of 
TGS to SS must be constructed for the communication of freshness verification and revocation information. 
Should the SS subsequently receive a ticket for a client with an expired key, it will return the message 
components A+O (indicated above) to the client, which will be understood as a rejection, and the client can initiate 
the process again from the begging, this time, providing A can satisfy the requirement for KA, obtain a fresh key. 
Were each SS to maintain its own a database of previously revoked keys, the risk would be that should any 
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particular SS be down for any reason while an update notification was sent by the TGS that an SS could potentially 
be out of date. Another alternate would be to access a central DB. This could be performed automatically upon 
service restart, but since some server side operation requires several re-boots this also entails a degree of risk.  
Though involving more traffic and bandwidth safer is that the SS pro-actively contacts the TGS upon 
receipt of message 4 to confirm the current key. The acknowledgement is either a secure confirmation with no key 
transmitted and the SS can proceed, or a denial. In the case of the latter, the TGS has noted that the SS has received 
a stale key. If the TGS notes that the SS has received three stale keys within an arbitrary amount of time, say 300 
seconds, from the same client then it sends a message to the AS which ‘locks out’ the offending client for an 
arbitrary amount of time, say 30 minutes, and recording secured log-file entries. To avoid denial of service, DOS, 
attacks based on failed logins, the AS will silently drop further authentication requests for the lockout duration. 
Client side software will display the lockout notification correspondingly. 
 
Constituting, backend messages 6 and 7 6. SS     TGS: KASS(TS2+Kssu+SQNO) 
     7. TGS  SS: KASS(TS2+SQNO) 
 
Only if Kssu is the current valid key can the SS determine the correct value of KASS and thus TGS decrypts 
successfully Kssu and the other components from this message. 
When the SS can successfully decrypt the expected values of TS2+SQNO then the key Kssu must be current, 
and the process can proceed. Where the values do not match those expected, the client is sent an “access denied” 
message. A time stamp is employed in this situation as a further freshness check, the decrypted value should be 
within a pre-set parameter of the recipients’ system clock. It is assumed that clock synchronisation protocols are in 
use among hosts within the realm. 
5. Solution 
5.1 Identity Management 
 
Adjacent to the hostname theme, which should be unique within a realm, it is not unreasonable that a name 
collision could occur, should a host transfer between realms, resulting in the re-naming of either party. As provision 
for this, the use of Universally Unique Identification numbers, UUIDs, is recommended as an attribute of the named 
entity. However, this is a misnomer, the intention is that individual UUID represents the entity, and further aspects 
are added as attributes of it. Therefore, the UUID should not be based on properties of the named object, but rather 
derived from a Version 4 random generation method12. In this way, changes to a User or Host name can be readily 
accommodated, with the UUID retaining attributes of both old and new names, while retaining other access 
permissions. 
Since the realm administrator has no control over the names of Users engaged within the enterprise, and the 
User name is fundamental to the Login process, even though as indicated above it is the UUID that is the core entity, 
a policy still needs to be implemented dealing with name clashes such as the existence of e.g. three Gloria Jones’s 
within the enterprise. 
 
5.2 Inter Realm Linkage 
 
Cross realm authentication to gain access to services in another realm will involve the AS from the ‘client 
realm’ registering with the ‘service realm.’ Registering an AS with a corresponding realms TSG is simpler than 
registering the client AS with the service AS. In this manner, both realms are bound in a uni-directional TRUST 
relationship. Should the registration be reciprocal, both realms are said to be in a mutual trust relationship. Where 
the number of realms involved is minimal, the resulting mesh may not be too complicated, but as the numbers grow 
can quickly become out of hand. Therefore, to facilitate pass-through authentication, or ‘implicit trust’, it is more 
effective to register one AS with the AS of the neighbouring realm. In this way, realms may be chained where a 
client of realm A can access services in realm C, because realm A is a client of realm B, and realm B is a client of 
realm C. Now groups of realms may be configured into divisions with apex realm of one division being registered 
with the apex of its neighbour forming a league, thus avoiding endlessly long chains, illustrated in figure 2 below. 
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Mutual registration proceeds  AS(A)    AS(B) : Na + Ra + IDAS(a) + ^ 
 
The Authentication service of realm A sends a nonce of its devising, its realm name, its ID and the special 
character ^ (here indicating registration) to the Authentication service for realm B. 
 
AS(B)     AS(A) : Nb +Rb + IDAS(b) + Kf(Nb + Na + Kab) 
 
The Authentication Service for realm B replies with its own nonce, its realm name, its service ID, and an 
encryption of both nonces plus a session key. Upon receipt if Nb + Na decrypt successfully AS(A) will register 
AS(B) as an authentication neighbour. 
 
  AS(A)    AS(B) : Kab(Nb + Na) 
 
The Authentication service of realm A returns both nonces encrypted with the session key, which upon 
successful decryption the AS(B) accepts as registration of AS(A) as an authentication neighbour. For success AS(A) 
and AS(B) must be pre-registered in each other’s DNS, and the encryption key Kf must be pre-shared out of band. 
 
To De-Register: 
 
AS(A)    AS(B) : IDAS(a) + Na + Ra + Ç  
AS(B)       AS(A) : Nb + Kf(Nb + Na + Kab) +Rb 
AS(A)    AS(B) : Kf(Nb + Na + Kab) 
  
The process is largely the same as for registration except the special character Ç initiating the deregistration 
process. Note, ^ and Ç are standard though uncommon ascii characters 94 and 128, and should not give problems. 
 
5.3 Realm Hierarchies 
 
Because any single AS may have several neighbours, the routing of authentication requests is an important 
consideration. In the simplest case a broadcast to all neighbours would result is the request also being re-transmitted 
to its point of origin, potentially resulting in a loop. The TGS could note the originating realm, as part of the 
principle designator, and filter a broadcast to exclude that realm, otherwise routing information (destination realm) 
would need to be included. 
Consider the scenario where AS(A) for realm .mycom needs to access service sql.therecom under AS(E). 
The neighbour AS(B) has two further neighbours AS(C) and AS(D). AS(E) is located behind AS(C), but AS(B) 
cannot know this as AS(E) is not its immediate neighbour. 
 
 
Fig 2. Realm association chaining in Orthus 
 
Existing IP routing protocols can be leveraged to solve the issue of interrogating ones neighbours database-
of-neighbours, ‘location table’ to determine a path to rout requests. Ultimately, AS(A) acting on behalf of client 
joe.mycom will recognise that a request for sql.therecom is not for its realm and will forward it onto its only 
neighbour AS(B) for realm .youcom. 
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5.4 Realm Location 
 
Where large Leagues are concerned, a simple broadcast, and re-broadcast would prove inadequate, as it 
could result in the client AS waiting indefinitely for replies that may never come. There has to be a mechanism for 
the AS to know the size of the League to which it is connected. To enable this, by the Yin/Yang scheme, each AS 
must maintain a ‘location table’ of all realms, and realms to which they connect. To build these tables it is necessary 
for each AS to announce to its neighbours any changes in its environment, which will therefore cascade through the 
whole league. For example should a new Division join an existing League there will be an initial cross-transfer of 
authentication authority information once the apex nodes register with each other. This is analogous to a network 
transport routing protocol except that in general there will only be one path between any two AS’s and the issue is 
not one of finding the optimal path to a destination; but rather whether a path exists. 
Unlike a transport routing table13, the location table lists neighbour pairs, a particular realm appearing on a 
line for each neighbour, and that neighbour appearing on lines corresponding to its neighbours, figure 3. 
 
 
Yin Yang 
AS(A) AS(A.A) 
AS(A) AS(B) 
AS(B) AS(C) 
AS(B) AS(D) 
AS(C) AS(E) 
 
Fig 3. Example Orthus realm Location Table 
 
The client AS scans its copy of the location table for an entry on the Yang column of its destination realm 
AS(E). When found it reads the associated Yin entry AS(C), and subsequently searches for a higher Yang entry of 
such. It then reads the corresponding Yin entry AS(B). Once a similar scan reveals that AS(B) is an immediate 
neighbour of AS(A) then the rout is established. 
 
AS(A)  AS(B)  AS(C)   AS(E) 
 
An AS now knows how to address packets for transport to its most appropriate neighbour, and each AS 
along the path can determine from its copy of the table, which neighbour AS to pass the request onto. 
For those cases where the target realm has several neighbours the querying system needs to track in 
memory all paths leading backward that do not lead back to the initiator realm until a successful path is found. In 
those rare cases where two or more paths are found it will be assumed that the shortest, the one with the least hops, 
is preferable. Situations may also arise where an administrator in the initiator realm is aware of a Departmental 
realm of the Global Corporation and attempts a registration, but that realm for various reasons, company politics or 
security, does not connect to the usual corporate WAN. In this case, an error message is returned to the effect that 
the registration cannot be completed. 
Sanitation (defragmentation) and optimisation (indexing) of these tables upon tuple insertion/deletion as 
new realms are registered, or upon deregistration, is out of scope at this time. 
Incorporating ‘routing’ tables into an AS appears to be re-inventing the wheel, but relying on existing 
realm DNS cannot perform this task at League scales. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A comparison of possible underlying transport mechanisms revealed that UDP remains the choice of 
preference for Orthus. Further network infrastructure matters including PKI were discussed, as well as suggestions 
for port reservations. To compliment overall network security, DNSSEC, though not mandatory is a 
recommendation, as is HIP14, for host identity verification.  
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Completing the problem originally outlined, the structural basis for the functioning of Orthus authentication 
in large multi-realm enterprises has been presented. In particular, how realms are linked into hierarchical groups, 
and how clients from remote realms can locate the realm authoritative for their desired service, namely the 
Yin/Yang remote authentication authority discovery scheme. A method and usage of UUIDs was proposed, a key 
verification (freshness check) and revocation method was discussed. Not least, the Orthus protocol was presented in 
version II enhancing its security. Building these features directly into the protocol at this stage may help to avoid the 
complications involved in getting other authentication protocols to work across realm boundaries. 
Healthcare is as security conscious in protecting its computing and networked resources as any other field 
of activity. Security is always enhanced by providing more layers for the attacker to traverse. Orthus helps enhance 
the security of authentication by separating the process into two events, thus providing more obstacles for malicious 
attack to overcome. 
The weakest link in any security system is the passwords used to generate encryption keys. Human nature 
being what it is, it is probably best, at least partially, to take this out of the loop, by the use of random password 
generation via hardware tokens. Depending on security requirements, these could be iOs, or android apps. Recent 
enhancements to the reliability of biometric authentication systems may also alleviate this problem, and one avenue 
of further research may be in adapting Orthus to incorporate biometrics. 
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